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## For What Reason Do Thinkers Find Identity Disorders Interesting?

Dr. Farida Bibi<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Maria Lopez<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Mohammad Abbas<sup>3</sup>

### Designation

<sup>1</sup>Department of Social Work, University of Karachi

<sup>2</sup>Department of Social Work, University of California, Los Angeles, USA

<sup>3</sup>Department of Social Work, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh

### Abstract

Individuals diagnosed with "identity disorders" have a diverse range of mental health issues that are marked by significant fluctuations in their subjective perception of self-identity. The formation of an individual's subjective sense of self and trans temporal identity can be influenced by a diverse array of circumstances, including: The absence of preconception can result in a complete loss of bodily consciousness, leading to a state of self-awareness that is devoid of any bodily sensations (Cole, 1995; Gallagher & Cole, 1995; Sacks, 1998). Schizophrenia, departmentalization disorders, and dissociative identity disorder (DID) are among the mental health illnesses that can lead to a disruption in an individual's perception of their own identity. In certain instances of this particular type of dissolution, numerous distinct selves coexist within a singular physical entity. The evaluation of state-classes as self-representational content holds equal importance to the assessment of their functional appropriateness or phenomenology. The redistribution of the perceptual characteristic known as "mistiness" or "sense of ownership" is notably observed in the second set of conditions mentioned earlier, inside the realm of representational space. In conclusion, the existence of a minimum of four separate identification delusions (DM1) may be observed, namely reduplication par-amnesia, Frolic syndrome, inter metamorphosis, reverse inter metamorphosis, and Cascaras syndrome.

## Introduction

In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the self-conscious mind that is both theoretically robust and empirically valid, it is imperative to subject our conceptual frameworks to rigorous testing using a diverse range of examples that represent the vast array of phenomena we aim to investigate. The utilization of case studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry greatly facilitates the process of "reverse engineering," rendering them generally advantageous. Undoubtedly, a more profound understanding of the conscious experience of personal identity in ordinary situations can be achieved through the establishment of a scientifically valid representationalism and functional explanation of challenges related to identity. Furthermore, it is imperative to establish a viable solution for the condition commonly referred to as "Philosopher's Syndrome," which entails the inclination to conflate a dearth of creativity with a perception of inevitability (Dennett, 1991, p. 401). Nevertheless, there remains a substantial amount of knowledge yet to be uncovered.

Psychologists can get valuable insights from philosophers, such as the notion that an individual's concept of self should not be regarded as a tangible item like to a bicycle or a hairdo. From a purely logical perspective, it can be argued that identity should be understood as a relation rather than a property. The connection being discussed is highly subtle, as it establishes a comprehensive interlinkage between several elements. Nevertheless, the neurophysiological level of description reveals just three representations of this association: representations of an individual brain, representations of an individual's conscious self-experience, and representations of a general connection between the two. Furthermore, an examination is conducted to explore the diverse mechanisms via which the process of self-representation may be compromised in psychiatric disorders. However, even the absence of a personal identity, an unidentified object or possession, remains unaltered or unharmed. Several aspects related to representation and functionality within the central nervous system undergo alterations. Based solely on theoretical considerations, it is plausible to assert that an individual who possesses a particular impairment affecting cognitive faculties may no longer satisfy the criteria for personhood. For instance, this could be exemplified by a patient who has experienced an irreversible loss of all recollections pertaining to their past existence and the capacity to engage in rational cognitive processes. The potential impact on the patient's phenomenology may not be altered as a consequence of this. The existence of a "personal identity" within the brain or any other domain is unsubstantiated. The concept in question may be regarded as an abstract theoretical construct that presents challenges in comprehension, or alternatively, it may manifest as a tangible manifestation of an individual's subjective cognitive state. In order to enhance their professional approach, psychiatrists should refrain from adopting a simplistic realism perspective while evaluating patients' self-perceptions.

To begin with, it can be argued that psychiatrists have the potential to enlighten philosophers regarding the comprehensive nature of the concept of "personal identity." This extends beyond the conventional theoretical research domain that primarily focuses on inquiries such as, "What factors establish the continuity of individuals, both in the present moment and over time?" At the level of subjective experience, the human brain per-reflectively and theoretically represents distinct unique identities.

Is my understanding accurate? The concept of the phenomenal selfmodel (PSM), as described by Metzinger (2003a), refers to a concrete representation of one's own being, which can potentially encompass an individual's identity. It is the content of this representation that constitutes the conscious self. However, what precisely is the phenomenon that we are observing? The inquiry

into the continuity of personal identity over history and the cultural factors that facilitate such continuity is of paramount importance. If the information processing system possesses a self-representation that is both globally accessible and integrated, it enables the system to establish new forms of connections internally. This is achieved by accessing many sorts of information pertaining to the system, which are treated as information about the system itself. The development of the subjective impression of transtemporal identity can occur if a sufficient amount of data remains consistent over time.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to exercise utmost prudence within the present circumstances. The concepts of identity and indiscernibility exhibit clear distinctions from one other. In contrast to indiscriminability, the concept of identity operates in a reciprocal manner.

The lack of discernibility of the self-model could perhaps explain the presence of functional consistencies, such as those related to background emotions, autobiographical memory, and body image.

Nevertheless, the explicit depiction of these functional invariances has the potential to generate the phenomenon known as transtemporal sameness, which refers to the continuity experienced throughout a period of time. Moreover, this phenomenology serves as the fundamental basis for our theoretical examination of uniqueness and, above all, enables us to articulate our own identities as individuals. The book in question would not have been authored by us, and its consumption would not have been possible for you, were it not for the indispensable contribution of phenomenology. The establishment of phenomenological self-representation serves as the fundamental basis for conceptual self-representation, while characteristics operating at the subpersonal level of the brain exert a disproportionately influential impact on qualities at the personal level. It is crucial for philosophers to possess a comprehensive understanding of the inherent fragility and vulnerability of human beings with regards to these foundational attributes. In order to provide greater precision, it is imperative for individuals who possess a genuine interest in the field of self-awareness philosophy to recognize the substantial neurophenomenological prerequisites associated with person hood. Furthermore, it is crucial to acknowledge that no facet of human self-awareness remains impervious to disruptions in knowledge caused by sub personal disintegration. Lastly, it is essential to consider and incorporate empirical limitations as they pertain to this subject matter. Psychiatry and philosophy have common epistemic objectives. One crucial aspect to consider is the potential for further significant advancements, such as the augmentation of our comprehension about human self-awareness. A comprehensive elucidation of the conscious mind that maintains coherence in terms of phenomenology, empirical evidence, and philosophical principles is urgently required. Therefore, it is crucial to commence the investigation of unconventional neurophenomenological manifestations of self-awareness by examining them from two distinct perspectives: theoretical psychiatry and the metatheory 6 proposed by analytical philosophy of mind.

The following is an illustration of the second-guessing fallacy.

To commence our discussion, it is pertinent to provide a definition of the concept at hand. According to Breen et al. (2000), "transformational identity" can be defined as the firm belief held by an individual that they have experienced a profound alteration, both physically and psychologically, resulting in their emergence as a distinct and separate entity (p. 75). My argument posits that even if a creature lacking the capacity to generate beliefs in the narrower philosophical sense may nonetheless be susceptible to this ailment due to its reliance on an aberrant form of

subjective self-representation. The above excerpt is derived from a case study conducted by Nora Breen et al., which focuses on a patient named Roslyn Z. who had a delusional belief regarding her gender identity, perceiving herself as male. During the initial testing phase two months ago, RZ exhibited consistent hallucinations of a recurring kind. While she frequently saw him as her paternal figure, there were instances where she mistakenly perceived him as her grandfather. During our last encounter, it was seen that RZ had assimilated her father's demeanor. Upon being requested to provide her signature, she proceeded to inscribe her father's name and affix her own signature. Whenever someone asked about her background, she consistently discussed her father. For example, there are claims that she made false statements regarding her age, specifically asserting that she was 60 years old. The user's text does not contain any information to rewrite. The subsequent excerpts consist of interview responses provided by RZ. During the entirety of the interview, Lil, the mother of RZ, was present at her side.

One potential initial approach to developing a scientifically validated and conceptually sound explanation of Cotard disease could involve positing that it is primarily a cognitive response, occurring at the modularized level, to an extremely uncommon perceptual occurrence (Young & Leafhead, 1996). Nevertheless, it is imperative to recognize that the intricate and multifaceted nature of the phenomenology associated with firmly believing in one's own nonexistence may be beyond the scope of conventional belief-desire frameworks. This is due to the fact that the phenomenon involves illness at levels of phenomenal self-representation that are non-propositional.

It is imperative for any prospective philosophical theory of mind to incorporate an analysis of the phenomenon known as "existence denial" in Cotard subjects, recognizing it as a significant phenomenological limitation that necessitates the development of distinct conceptual frameworks. The recognition of certain constraints resulting from cerebral trauma is a characteristic feature observed in numerous neurological conditions. The disorders in question pose a challenge to the central tenets of Cartesian epistemic transparency for phenomenal self-consciousness, specifically the belief that individuals are incapable of being mistaken about their own thoughts, that unnoticed errors are impossible, and that knowledge is fully evident within the self. One particularly intriguing example of this representational configuration is evident in the pure and extreme manifestations of the Cotard delusion. It is not uncommon for individuals who are facing a terminal illness to strongly assert their nonexistence. The notion of a conscious subject that genuinely denies its own existence, which may initially appear to be a priori impossible, is in fact a phenomenon that may be observed through phenomenological analysis. Phenomenology warrants recognition and esteem as well. One must initially comprehend that the nature of one's subjective self-experience in this particular condition can be aptly characterized as "non-existence" even during a state of complete wakefulness. In other words, individuals provide accounts of irrational auto phenomenological occurrences due to the tangible and theoretically plausible cognitive structures within their brains. In order to provide a comprehensive explanatory framework that integrates functional and nonscientific perspectives, it is imperative to undertake a representational analysis of the phenomenon under investigation.

The Cotard patient, in its less severe manifestations, perfectly reflects the statements that would be made by an exceedingly rare phenomenon known as a pathological self-misidentification.

Gerrans' hypothesis posits that the distinctive phenomenon of PSM (phenomenal self-model) arises from a widespread reduction in emotion, which can be attributed to the diffusion of the

neurochemical substrate responsible for the actual deficit and subsequently comprehended cognitively. Firstly, it is imperative to discuss the feasibility of implementing such a propensity score matching (PSM) approach. However, due to the reliance on conventional philosophical explanations rooted on propositional attitudes and belief-desire psychology, there may be challenges in establishing the necessary connections across various levels of description in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the event under consideration. It is conceivable that a non-verbal animal, such as a monkey, could undergo a significant portion of Cotard's phenomenology while providing inaccurate autophenomenological accounts. Animals possess the capacity to experience mental and physical states akin to a state of lifelessness, although their cognitive abilities may not extend to the level of introspection or verbal articulation on their subjective experiences. The human condition exhibits a distinctive characteristic that gives rise to the emergence of a novel, stringent, and distinct component within the framework of the cognitive self-model. Once a comprehensive comprehension of the representation and functioning of the self-model in human patients with Cotard syndrome is achieved, the subsequent step involves exploring the philosophical inquiry regarding the feasibility of experiencing intense first-person phenomena, as defined by Lynne Baker (1998; also referenced in Metzinger 2003a,b), while simultaneously contemplating the potential nonexistence of a first-person perspective. I will provide a more comprehensive analysis of this topic in the subsequent section.

The research of the Cotard effect involves examining the phenomenon wherein a patient experiences the loss of a complete layer of non-conceptual, lucid material, while simultaneously exhibiting the emergence of novel, quasi-conceptual, obscure content within their phenomenal self-model. Is there an alternative approach to elucidate how the information that is no longer accessible within the patient's subjective perception of reality influences the unfolding of events? What is the underlying cause for the frequent alterations in his "web of belief"? The theory of "emotional disembodiment" presents a plausible alternative explanation, which is more specific in nature. The individual diagnosed with Cotard's syndrome has a notable absence of emotional affect, hence presenting challenges in establishing a subjective sense of self-awareness. The remarkable attribute of "prereflexive self-intimacy," referring to a constant sense of being intimately connected with oneself, could perhaps be the same aspect that individuals afflicted with Cotard syndrome lack. The patient diagnosed with Cotard syndrome is not in a state of being infinitely close to herself, but rather in a state of being infinitely far. Emotional content that is self-representational can provide insights into the underlying logic of autonomic self-regulation, which pertains to the organism's inherent life processes. This is because emotional content often reveals the strategies employed by an organism to ensure its survival. The Cotard sufferer experiences a lack of existential meaning in their life. The individual's life process remains in operation and actively manifested within their body at all times. However, it is no longer considered their possession, as it is now represented by a Personal Subjective Model (PSM).

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